Analysis · 13 Nov 2026 · every US airport

FAA Nationwide Ground Stop (Nov 13, 2026): How One Router Grounded US Air Traffic

Seventeen of the country's 22 en route centers had their radios and radar feeds falter at the same time. Here is what that afternoon looks like from a controller's chair, and how one piece of network gear in southern Arkansas could do it.

What caused the ground stop?

On Friday, November 13, 2026, contractor L3Harris switched on a new router at an FAA radio site in El Dorado, Arkansas, during a copper-to-fiber upgrade. The FAA's telecom network was flooded with connection requests, and older equipment became unstable, disrupting radio and radar feeds at 17 of the 22 en route centers. Departures nationwide stopped at 3:54 p.m. ET and resumed at 8:15 p.m. About 12,462 flights were cancelled. The FAA has found no evidence of a cyberattack.

The facts
Ground stop3:54 p.m. to 8:15 p.m. ET, Fri 13 Nov 2026 (4 h 20 min)
AirborneAbout 3,500 aircraft, all landed safely (FAA)
Affected17 of 22 en route centers and several TRACONs
CancellationsAbout 12,462 (FAA)
TriggerAbout 1,000 connection requests every 4 to 5 seconds on the FAA's telecom network
SitesRadio site, El Dorado, Arkansas (new router); radar site, Amarillo, Texas (equipment replaced 3 weeks earlier)
ContractorL3Harris, which runs the FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure network
Cyberattack?No evidence of one (FAA)

What it looks like from the scope

An en route controller doesn't talk to aircraft from the building. The controller's voice goes down a leased line to a remote radio site, sometimes hundreds of miles away, and the radar picture comes back over more lines from long-range radars spread across the region. All of those lines ride one telecom network. So when that network floods, a controller's world doesn't go dark all at once. It stutters. The FAA says not every frequency and radar feed was lost; some stayed usable throughout.

~3:30
Frequencies start to fail.A check-in comes through clipped, then a pilot doesn't answer. The first thought is a problem with one aircraft. The second is that the whole area is hearing the same thing, and the supervisor is already on the phone.
~3:40
Radar starts to coast.When a radar feed drops, the automation keeps drawing each target where it expects the aircraft to be. That holds for a few sweeps. After that, the data block on the scope is a prediction, and controllers know it.
3:54
The Command Center stops the inflow.The fastest way to protect a sector you can't fully see or talk to is to stop sending more aircraft into it. A national ground stop does that at every airport at once. It doesn't touch the roughly 3,500 aircraft already flying.
4:00 on
Work what you have to the ground.Airborne traffic keeps going, and controllers bring each flight down: backup radios, a neighbour's frequency, another aircraft relaying a call, altitude separation that doesn't need a radar. Every hour the scope gets emptier.
8:15
The stop lifts. The delays don't.Engineers blocked the two sites and turned off the broadcast function on the new routers and about 60 similar ones. Departures restart, metered. Thousands of crews and aircraft are now in the wrong cities, which is why cancellations ran on into Saturday.

The times in the first two rows are approximate and describe how controllers normally work a failure like this, not reports from a particular facility. The 3:54 and 8:15 times are the FAA's.

How it works · why a ground stop, not a sky stop

Aircraft in the air can't wait; aircraft at the gate can. When a center loses part of its picture, controllers need fewer aircraft, not new rules. Stopping departures freezes the inflow while the traffic already airborne lands on its own, usually within an hour or two over the continental US.

How can one router ground the country?

The FAA's radios and radars don't sit inside its centers. Hundreds of remote radio and radar sites connect back over the FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure network, which L3Harris runs for the FAA. Much of it still uses copper circuits and older time-division multiplexing (TDM) equipment, and the FAA is moving it to fiber; L3Harris says that conversion is more than 70% done.

According to Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy, when L3Harris switched on a new router at El Dorado, large amounts of data also started flowing from a radar site in Amarillo, Texas, where L3Harris had replaced equipment about three weeks earlier. The network was hit with about 1,000 connection requests every four to five seconds. FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford said the old TDM equipment failed under that load while the newer IP switches stayed up. Whether the fault was the router itself or how it was installed is still being investigated; the router is being tested at an L3Harris lab in Florida with FAA staff present.

The detail that matters to a controller: the network is shared. A storm of traffic from one site doesn't stay at that site. It fills the circuits every other radio and radar depends on, which is how a problem in southern Arkansas can reach a frequency in another part of the country.

SectorLive's take

This is the failure controllers train for and hope never to see across the whole country at once. The backups did their job: the FAA says every airborne flight landed safely. What failed was the plumbing behind the scope. A controller can work around one bad frequency or one radar. Nobody can work around a network that every frequency and radar depends on.

Work a sector with the radios working

SectorLive runs every real flight in Southern California and Las Vegas, gate to gate. Take a center or approach sector in your browser and see how fast it fills up when nobody stops the departures.

How it compares

Nationwide ground stops are rare. The FAA stopped all departures in January 2023, when its NOTAM system failed overnight. November 13 lasted longer, and Reuters called it the longest US shutdown since 9/11. Both were IT failures, not weather or a security threat. The next day, the FAA's telecom problems were still in the news when a UPS 767 and a Copa 737 collided on a Miami taxiway; nothing links the two. Five days later, Hollywood Burbank Airport's tower went ATC Zero over staffing issues, a separate local event.

What happens next

The FAA says it has dealt with the initial cause but is still looking for the root cause. Duffy has asked Congress for $50 billion to modernize air traffic control and says the telecom network is still built on 1980s architecture. Lawmakers have asked for investigations into the outage. We'll update this page when the FAA publishes its findings.

Questions people ask

Frequently asked questions

What caused the FAA ground stop?

A flood of connection requests on the FAA's telecom network after L3Harris switched on a new router at a radio site in El Dorado, Arkansas. Older equipment failed under the load, disrupting radio and radar at 17 of 22 en route centers.

Was it a cyberattack?

The FAA says it has found no evidence of a cyberattack or other malicious act.

How long was the ground stop?

From 3:54 p.m. to 8:15 p.m. Eastern, about four hours and 20 minutes.

What happened to planes already in the air?

They kept flying. About 3,500 aircraft were airborne when the stop began, and the FAA says all of them landed safely.

What is L3Harris's role?

L3Harris runs the FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure network that links radio and radar sites to air traffic facilities. It was replacing a router at the El Dorado site.

How many flights were cancelled?

About 12,462, according to the FAA.

Evidence and references

Sources

Official and news reports

The "from the scope" timeline explains how controllers normally work a failure like this. It is not an account from a particular facility. Facts and figures come from the reports above.